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THE PROPER FoCUS FOR FDA
REGULATIONS: WHY THE
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO SELF-
PRESERVATION SHOULD ALLOW
TERMINALLY ILL PATIENTS WITH No
TREATMENT OPTIONS TO ATTEMPT TO
SAVE THEIR LIVES
Alissa Puckett*
N May of 2006, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals ("D.C.
Circuit") held that competent, terminally ill patients had a fundamen-
tal right under the Due Process Clause "to informed access to poten-
tially life saving drugs where no alternative, government-approved
treatment option exists."' The case was originally remanded for a deter-
mination on whether the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") regu-
lations were narrowly tailored, but has been set for rehearing en banc
based on the appellees' petition.2 The D.C. Circuit's initial holding raised
important questions about the rights of the terminally ill and how far gov-
ernment drug regulation extends. To minimize expansion of such a pre-
cedent, the case is likely to reach the Supreme Court.3 This comment
argues that the Supreme Court may find that the right to self-preserva-
tion is a fundamental right, and that the Court should hold that this right
extends to access to experimental drugs for terminally ill patients with no
other treatment options. If the Court recognizes the asserted right, sub-
stantive due process requires the government's compelling interest in
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Dedman School of Law, Southern Methodist Univer-
sity, May 2008; M.A. in Technical Communication, Boise State University; B.S. in Secon-
dary Education, University of Idaho. I would like to thank my husband and family for their
support, as well as Professor Linda S. Eads, SMU Dedman School of Law, for her insight
and feedback on an earlier draft of this Comment.
1. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Von Eschenbach,
445 F.3d 470, 486 (D.C. Cir. 2006), vacated, reh'g granted en banc, No. 04-5350, 2006 U.S.
App. LEXIS 28974, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 21, 2006) (rehearing was granted based on the
appellees' petition).
2. Id.
3. The Court would most likely grant certiorari to address concerns about expansion
of precedent and its application to palliative care issues. Interview with Linda S. Eads,
Associate Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University, in Dallas, Tex. (Feb. 2, 2007).
The Appellees likely requested a rehearing en banc to strengthen a future petition for
certiorari.
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protecting the public from dangerous drugs to be narrowly tailored. The
current FDA regulations are arbitrarily enforced and overbroad for ter-
minally ill patients without treatment alternatives. A terminally ill pa-
tient who has exhausted all other treatment options should be allowed to
access experimental drugs in an attempt to save her life.
Part I discusses the importance of the Court's holdings in Cruzan v.
Director, Missouri Department of Health4 and Washington v. Glucksberg,5
as well as the two-part test provided in Glucksberg, to determine whether
an unenumerated right is fundamental under the Due Process Clause.
Part II delineates FDA regulations and case law regarding treatment ac-
cess for terminally ill patients. Part III reviews the D.C. Circuit's original
holding in Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v.
Von Eschenbach6 and the Glucksberg analysis used by the panel to deter-
mine that there must be a complementary, fundamental "right to life."'7
Part IV argues that, based on precedent, the Supreme Court should hold
that there is a fundamental right to self-preservation, and that the Court
should extend that right to include access to experimental drugs for ter-
minally ill patients who do not have approved treatment options availa-
ble. Part V argues that if the Court holds that the terminally ill have a
fundamental right to access experimental treatment when there are no
approved alternatives, the FDA regulations are not narrowly tailored for
these patients.
I. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
United States Supreme Court substantive due process jurisprudence
does not provide a clear method of determining whether an asserted,
unenumerated right is fundamental. 8 The Court has used several differ-
ent methods to determine whether a fundamental right exists, without
providing a clear test for the lower courts to apply.9 When a case asserts
a "new" fundamental right, it is currently unclear how lower courts are
expected to reach a decision or properly define the right asserted. 10 In
4. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
5. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
6. 445 F.3d 470 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
7. Id. at 477-83. On November 21, 2006, the court vacated the May 2006 judgment
and set the case for rehearing en banc based on the appellees' petition. Abigail Alliance,
No. 04-5350, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 28974, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 21, 2006). Oral argument
before the en bance court was held March 1, 2007. Court Docket, Abigail Alliance for
Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Von Eschenbach, No. 04-5350 (D.C. Cir. Sept.
30, 2004).
8. See, e.g., John F. Basiak, Jr., Inconsistent Levels of Generality in the Characteriza-
tion of Unenumerated Fundamental Rights, 16 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 401, 406 (2005)
(arguing that there is no "inherent mechanism of interpretation" for unenumerated funda-
mental rights, leaving the lower federal courts to "characterize these rights in whatever
manner they see fit" and making the interpretation "inherently susceptible to
manipulation").
9. Id.
10. See Seeley v. State, 940 P.2d 604, 630 (Wash. 1997) (Sanders, J., dissenting) (stating
that "simply labeling the interest has proven dispositive because strict scrutiny is virtually
impossible to pass while rational basis is virtually impossible to fail"); see also Basiak,
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the majority of cases not dealing with sexuality or same-sex marriage,
courts have followed the two-part test provided in Washington v. Gluck-
sberg," which includes properly defining the asserted right and analyzing
legal history and tradition to determine whether the right is fundamental
under the Due Process Clause. 12 Abigail Alliance used the Glucksberg
test to find a fundamental right to self-preservation for terminally ill pa-
tients who exhausted all other treatment options before requesting access
to Phase II clinical trial drugs from the FDA.1 3 To do this, the D.C. Cir-
cuit first inferred a fundamental right to self-preservation from prior Su-
preme Court decisions, and then extended that right to access to medical
treatment in a narrowly defined situation.1 4 The D.C. Circuit inferred a
fundamental right to self-preservation from the Supreme Court's holding
in Cruzan.15
Cruzan held that the State could require a clear and convincing evi-
dence standard for guardians trying to discontinue nutrition and hydra-
tion of a person in a persistent vegetative state, based on the State's
interest in "protect[ing] and preserv[ing] human life."'1 6 To reach its hold-
ing, the Court assumed that a competent person had a constitutionally
protected right to refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition based on lib-
erty interest articulated in prior decisions.' 7 The Court discussed a num-
ber of cases that recognized the common-law right to self-
determination, 18 then stated that it was beyond dispute that the Due Pro-
cess Clause "protect[ed] an interest in life as well as an interest in refus-
ing life-sustaining medical treatment." 9
Based on this interest in life, and the assumed right to refuse medical
treatment, Glucksberg later held that the terminally ill did not have a
constitutional right to assisted suicide.20 The Court acknowledged estab-
supra note 8, at 406; but see Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empiri-
cal Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 822 (2006)
(showing strict scrutiny is not always fatal and has up to a 50% survival rate in the federal
courts).
11. 521 U.S. 702 (1997); see Brian Hawkins, Note, The Glucksberg Renaissance: Sub-
stantive Due Process Since Lawrence v. Texas, 105 MICH. L. REV. 409, 411 (2006) (survey-
ing 188 unenumerated, fundamental rights cases decided after Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S.
558 (2003), and finding that the majority of courts follow Glucksberg unless an issue specif-
ically involving sexuality or same-sex marriage is being addressed); see, e.g., Williams v.
Att'y Gen. of Ala., 378 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2004).
12. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721.
13. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Von Eschenbach,
445 F.3d 470, 476-84 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
14. Id. at 477-78.
15. Id. at 479-84.
16. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 280, 284 (1990).
17. Id. at 278-79.
18. Id. at 269-70 (quoting Schloendorff v. Soc'y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y.
1914) ("Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what
shall be done with his own body .... ")); In re Quinlin, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976), cert.
denied sub nom., Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976) ("On balance, the right to self-
determination ordinarily outweighs any countervailing state interests, and competent per-
sons generally are permitted to refuse medical treatment, even at the risk of death.").
19. Id. at 281.
20. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 705-06, 734 (1997).
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lishing several unenumerated fundamental rights and liberty interests be-
yond the Bill of Rights, including the right to marry, to have children, to
direct the education and upbringing of one's children, to marital privacy,
to use of contraception, to bodily integrity, and to abortion.21 The Court
also expressed extreme reluctance to recognize new substantive due pro-
cess rights because the "guideposts" for how to do so were "scarce and
open-ended," requiring the "exercise [of] utmost care" to avoid expres-
sing individual policy preferences. 22
Glucksberg followed the "established method" of substantive due pro-
cess analysis, merging language from previous cases to create a two-part
test for determining whether the asserted "right to die" was fundamen-
tal.23 First, there had to be a "careful description" of the fundamental
liberty interest being asserted.24 And second, the right or liberty had to
be "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition"2 5 and "implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty," such that "neither liberty nor justice
would exist if they were sacrificed."'26 These threshold requirements
saved time by avoiding complex balancing of competing interests: if no
fundamental right was found, rational basis review only required a rea-
sonable relation to a legitimate state interest. 27
A. CAREFUL DESCRIPTION OF THE LIBERTY INTEREST
BEING ASSERTED
Respondents defined the asserted right as "the existence of a liberty
interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment which extends to a per-
sonal choice by a mentally competent, terminally ill adult to commit phy-
sician-assisted suicide. ' 28 They asserted a "liberty to choose how to die"
and a right to "control one's final days."' 29 The Court took issue with
21. Id. at 720 (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)
(plurality opinion) (right to have an abortion); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972)
(right to contraception for single individuals); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (right
to marry); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (right to contraception for married
individuals); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (right to bodily integrity); Skinner v.
Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (right to procreate); Pierce v. Soc'y of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (right to direct the upbringing and education of one's children);
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (right to control the education of one's children)).
22. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720 (quoting Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S.
115, 125 (1992)).
23. Id. at 720-22.
24. Id. at 721 (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993)); Collins, 503 U.S. at
125; Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 277-78. Note that this element is listed second in Glucksberg, but
the Court began its analysis with this element.
25. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721 (quoting Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494,
503 (1977) (plurality opinion)).
26. Id. (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26 (1937)).
27. Id. at 722. See Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955)
(explaining that for rational basis review, the law "need not be in every respect logically
consistent with its aims to be constitutional. It is enough that there is an evil at hand for
correction, and that it might be thought that the particular legislative measure was a ra-
tional way to correct it").
28. Id. at 708.
29. Id. at 722.
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respondents' definition, finding it imprecise, and crafted the question as
"whether the 'liberty' specially protected by the Due Process Clause in-
cludes a right to commit suicide which itself includes a right to assistance
in doing so."'30 The Court explained that the reference to Cruzan as a
"right to die" case was incorrect, since the Court was "more precise" in
assuming only that "the Constitution granted competent persons a consti-
tutionally protected right to refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition. '31
No other guidance was provided on how to determine the proper defini-
tion for an asserted right.
B. HISTORY, TRADITION, AND ORDERED LIBERTY
The Court then analyzed "our Nation's history, legal traditions, and
practices" regarding suicide.32 The right to suicide was not a part of the
National history or legal tradition, but anti-suicide provisions were "con-
sistent and enduring themes of our philosophical, legal, and cultural heri-
tages. ' 33 Additionally, even though common law punishments such as
criminal-forfeiture for individuals who committed suicide were removed
during colonial times, the prohibition for assisted suicide remained. 34
Glucksberg acknowledged that most states had recently reexamined their
assisted suicide bans due to medical and technological advances, yet reaf-
firmed them based on the state's interest in "the sanctity of life."'3 5
Glucksberg also rejected the argument that the long legal tradition pro-
tecting an individual's right to refuse treatment recognized in Cruzan
could be interpreted to stand for the ability to "hasten death" 36 or "trans-
muted into a right to assistance" to commit suicide.37 The Cruzan deci-
sion was based on legal tradition and the common law rule that forced
medication was battery-"entirely consistent" with history and constitu-
tional tradition.38 The Court also discarded the Ninth Circuit's conclu-
sion that Casey supported a right to physician-assisted suicide by
recognizing a liberty involving "the most intimate and personal choices a
30. Id. at 723. See Brandon R. Johnson, Note, "Emerging Awareness" After the Emer-
gence of Roberts: Reasonable Societal Reliance in Substantive Due Process Inquiry, 71
BROOK. L. REV. 1587, 1630 n. 88 (2006) (stating that a "precise definition of the right
questioned has been seen as vital to those opposed to the extension of substantive due
process protections"); see, e.g., Williams v. Att'y Gen. of Ala., 378 F.3d 1232, 1239 (11th
Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1152 (2005).
31. Glucksberg, 6521 U.S. at 722-23 (quoting Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497
U.S. 261, 280, 287 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring)) ("[A] liberty interest in refusing un-
wanted medical treatment may be inferred from our prior decisions.").
32. Id. at 710 (referencing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
849-50 (1992); Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 269-79; Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494,
503 (1977) (plurality opinion)).
33. Id. at 711.
34. Id. at 714-16.
35. Id. at 715-16 (acknowledging that most states heavily weighed the Model Penal
Code drafters' recognition of the threat assisted suicide posed to the "interests in the sanc-
tity of life that are represented by the criminal homicide laws") (emphasis added).
36. Id. at 725.
37. Id. at 726.
38. Id. at 725.
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person may make in a lifetime."'39 Similarly, respondents' argument that
Casey's recognition that liberty provided "the right to define one's own
concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of
human life" 40 did not "warrant the sweeping conclusion that any and all
important, intimate, and personal decisions [were] so protected. 41
C. THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS ANALYSIS
Based on these findings, the asserted right to assisted suicide was
neither fundamental nor protected under the Due Process Clause.42
Thus, Washington's assisted suicide ban was not subject to strict scrutiny
and only needed to be rationally related to legitimate government inter-
ests. 43 The State met the rational basis test easily. Washington had "un-
questionably important and legitimate" interests, including an
"unqualified interest in the preservation of human life";44 an interest in
protecting "vulnerable groups" from coercion, prejudice, stereotypes, and
"societal indifference"; 45 and a reasonable fear that allowing assisted sui-
cide would lead to voluntary or involuntary euthanasia. 46 The Court did
acknowledge Justice Stevens's concurrence in the judgment and his re-
fusal to "foreclose the possibility that an individual plaintiff seeking to
hasten her death, or a doctor whose assistance was sought, could prevail
in a more particularized challenge. '47 The majority opinion did not "ab-
solutely foreclose such a claim," although the claim would have to be
"quite different" from the one asserted in Glucksberg.48
Five justices signed on to the Court's reasoning in Glucksberg, although
there was no dissent. Justice O'Connor was the fifth vote, and she also
issued a concurring opinion to explain that the Court's decision did not
address whether a mentally competent person "experiencing great suffer-
ing [had] a constitutionally cognizable interest in controlling the circum-
stances of his or her imminent death."' 49 O'Connor also stressed that the
39. Id. at 726-27 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851
(1992)).
40. Id. (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 851).
41. Id. at 727.
42. Id. at 728. The Court also noted that the fundamental-rights-based analytical
method was proper and that Casey's reliance on Justice Harlan's dissent in Poe v. Ullman,
367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961), did not indicate that the Court had "jettison[ed]" the "established
approach." Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 722 n. 17.
43. Id. at 728. See Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955)
(explaining that for rational basis review, the law "need not be in every respect logically
consistent with its aims to be constitutional. It is enough that there is an evil at hand for
correction, and that it might be thought that the particular legislative measure was a ra-
tional way to correct it").
44. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 728 (quoting Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S.
261, 282 (1990)).
45. Id. at 732 (citing Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 49 F.3d 586, 593 (9th Cir.
1995)).
46. Id. at 728-35.
47. Id. at 735 n. 24.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 736 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice Ginsburg concurred with O'Connor,
while Justice Breyer joined O'Connor's concurrence except as it joined the opinion of the
Court. Id.
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law did not keep dying patients from receiving palliative care, "even
when doing so would hasten their deaths." 50
Justice Stevens, concurring in the judgment, stated that the individual's
right to physical autonomy, including refusing medical treatment, "will
give way to the State's interest in preserving human life" in most cases. 51
But, in unique circumstances, such as in Cruzan, he stressed the individ-
ual's freedom to refuse a particular kind of unwanted treatment, to re-
main dignified, and to "determin[e] the character of the memories that
will survive long after [one's] death."15 2 Stevens quoted his dissent in
Meachum v. Fano, stating that it is "self-evident" that men have unalien-
able liberty rights protected by the Due Process Clause, rather than "par-
ticular rights or privileges conferred by specific laws or regulations. '53
He emphasized that individuals who no longer have the option of decid-
ing whether to live or die have a "constitutionally protected interest that
may outweigh the State's interest in preserving life at all costs." ' 54 He also
noted that palliative care may not alleviate all pain and suffering.5 5
The Court assumed a right to refuse medical treatment for competent
adults in Cruzan, then determined the right to refuse medical treatment
did not extend to physician assisted suicide in Glucksberg. Glucksberg,
however, did not decide whether a mentally competent person who was
experiencing great suffering could control the circumstances of his death.
And even Stevens's concurrence in the judgment recognized that the
State's compelling interest in life required "preserving life at all costs."
56
Therefore, it can be inferred that since the State's compelling interest in-
cludes a right to self-preservation, it encompasses the right to attempt to
save one's life by accessing experimental medical treatment when there
are no approved alternatives. Nonetheless, the FDA's current policies,
along with case law in almost all jurisdictions, do not recognize such a
right.
II. TREATMENT ACCESS FOR THE TERMINALLY ILL
The FDA is responsible for ensuring that unapproved drugs, drugs that
are unsafe or ineffective for their purported use, are not distributed in the
United States.57 The United States has the most demanding prescription
50. Id. at 737-38 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Palliative care relieves or soothes symp-
toms of a disease without providing a cure. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF
THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (4th ed. 2004); see Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 802 (stating that
aggressive palliative care that may hasten a patient's death is legal since the purpose "is, or
may be, only to ease [the] patient's pain").
51. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 742 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
52. Id. at 743 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
53. Id. at 744 n.10 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting Meachum v.
Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 230 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
54. Id. at 745 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
55. Id. at 747 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting Meachum, 427 U.S. at
230) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
56. Id. at 745 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
57. See Veronica Henry, Problems with Pharmaceutical Regulation in the United States,
14 J. LEGAL MED. 617, 618 (1993).
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drug approval process in the world, with most new drugs taking approxi-
mately seven to ten years to reach the market.58 Drug regulation began
in 1906, when the Wiley Act, also known as the Pure Food and Drugs
Act, was signed into law and prohibited misbranded or adulterated food
and drugs in interstate commerce.59 The law did not prohibit false thera-
peutic claims, but only claims about the identity or composition of
drugs. 60 In 1937, 107 people, including children, died after ingesting a
drug that contained a poisonous liquid base.61 Based in part on this inci-
dent, Congress passed the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act
("FDCA") in 1938 to require drug manufacturers to prove the safety of a
drug for its intended use before the drug would be allowed on the mar-
ket.62 Clinical trials were allowed without prior approvals.63 In 1962,
partly in response to the Thalidomide tragedy, 64 Congress added safety
requirements to the drug approval process, including applications for ap-
proval before a clinical trial could be conducted, as well as proof that a
drug was safe and effective before the drug could be marketed. 65 The
FDA has provided detailed regulations controlling the clinical testing of
"new" drugs.66
A. WHAT IS A "NEW" DRUG?
Until the FDA's application and approval process is completed, the
FDCA prohibits drug manufacturers from introducing "new" drugs into
the market. 67 A "new" drug is any substance covered under the FDCA
not "generally recognized, among experts.., as safe and effective for use
under the conditions prescribed ... in the labeling."' 68 For a drug to be
approved by the FDA, drug manufacturers must provide "substantial"
evidence from controlled clinical trials that the drug will have its intended
effect. 69
58. Id. at 617.
59. Id. at 618; Jon Scott Batterman, Note, Brother Can You Spare a Drug: Should the
Experimental Drug Distribution Standards Be Modified in Response to the Needs of Persons
with AIDS?, 19 HOFSTRA L. REV. 191, 196 (1990). A drug is misbranded if the labeling is
false or misleading or does not have accurate directions and warnings about proper use.
See 21 U.S.C. § 352 (2006). A drug may be adulterated for several reasons, including un-
sanitary contents or packaging conditions, composition of the container rendering the con-
tents dangerous, banned coloring or additives, and misrepresentation of strength or
ingredients. See 21 U.S.C. § 351 (2006).
60. Henry, supra note 57, at 618.
61. Id. at 619.
62. Id.; Batterman, supra note 59, at 197-98.
63. See Batterman, supra note 59, at 200-01 (stating that because clinical trials did not
require prior approval, Thalidomide was distributed in the United States for experimental
testing, resulting in several children being born with deformed or missing limbs). Eight
thousand European mothers who took the drug to relieve morning sickness gave birth to
deformed babies. Henry, supra note 57, at 619.
64. Batterman, supra note 59, at 200-01; Henry, supra note 57, at 619.
65. Batterman, supra note 59, at 200-01; Henry, supra note 57, at 619.
66. See 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2006).
67. Id.
68. 21 U.S.C. § 321(p)(1) (2006).
69. Id. § 355(d).
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B. CLINICAL TRIALS: PURPOSE AND TIME FRAMES
The FDA has established four levels of testing required before new
drugs can receive approval to be marketed in the United States: one on
animals and three on humans.70 Animal testing shows the effect and tox-
icity of the new drug.71 If the tests are promising, a drug developer must
submit an Investigational New Drug ("IND") application to the FDA for
clinical testing. 72 The IND application becomes effective within thirty
days unless the FDA takes action to deny the application.73
Clinical trials are conducted in three phases. Phase I, which takes ap-
proximately one year to complete, is generally conducted on twenty to
eighty healthy human subjects to determine safety, the metabolism of the
drug, and side effects.7 4 Phase II trials, which last about two years, are
conducted on 100 to 300 subjects to determine effectiveness, short-term
side effects, and dosage levels.75 Phase II participants have the specific
disease and are divided into treatment and control groups. 76 Phase III
generally lasts around three years, involves several thousand subjects, and
determines long-term side effects, effectiveness over time, the risk-benefit
relationship of the drug, and a basis for physician labeling. 77 Phase III
subjects are also divided into treatment and control groups. Generally,
including animal testing, completing all phases of the required clinical tri-
als takes a minimum of seven years.
Gaining access to a clinical trial is difficult. 78 There are a limited num-
ber of spaces available for Phases II and III, and drug companies require
a patient to be in a certain stage of the disease, at least eighteen years of
age, and, in some cases, to not have taken certain drugs or treatments. 79
Recognizing the problem for terminally ill patients, the FDA has two ex-
ceptions to circumvent the clinical trial process: the treatment IND and
the compassionate IND or "fast track." 80
70. Id. § 355(i)(1)(A); Beth E. Myers, The Food and Drug Administration's Experi-
mental Drug Approval System: Is it Good for Your Health?, 28 Hous. L. REV. 309, 313-14
(1991).
71. Myers, supra note 70, at 313-14.
72. 21 U.S.C. § 355(i)(1)(A).
73. Id. § 355(i)(2).
74. See Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Von Es-
chenbach, 445 F.3d 470, 473 (2006); Henry, supra note 57, at 621; Myers, supra note 70, at
314.
75. See Abigail Alliance, 445 F.3d at 473; Henry, supra note 57, at 621; Myers, supra
note 70, at 314.
76. Henry, supra note 57, at 621; Myers, supra note 70, at 314.
77. Abigail Alliance, 445 F.3d at 473; Batterman, supra note 59, at 222; Henry, supra
note 57, at 621; Myers, supra note 70, at 314.
78. See Myers, supra note 70, at 310 (providing a real-life example of an AIDS patient
disqualified from participating in clinical studies due to his medical condition); see also
Abigail Alliance, 445 F.3d at 474 (noting that spaces in clinical trials are very limited com-
pared to need).
79. Abigail Alliance, 445 F.3d at 474 (alleging the type of patient who qualifies for a
clinical trial is limited); Myers, supra note 70, at 310.
80. See 21 U.S.C. § 356 (2006); Batterman, supra note 59, at 222-25; Henry, supra note
57, at 624-25; Myers, supra note 70, at 314-15.
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C. EXCEPTIONS AND ACCESS TO DRUGS IN CLINICAL TRIALS
The treatment IND program expanded access to unapproved drugs and
allowed doctors to prescribe such drugs to patients as if they were en-
rolled in a clinical trial.81 The purpose of the program is to provide termi-
nal patients with earlier access to experimental drugs while maintaining
the balance between the State's interest in health and safety and the indi-
vidual's right to life.82 There are four criteria for receiving permission for
a treatment IND: (1) the drug sought must be intended to treat a serious
or life-threatening illness, (2) an alternative drug or therapy must not be
available to treat the illness at that stage, (3) the drug must have com-
pleted or be completing investigation under a controlled clinical trial, and
(4) the sponsor of the clinical trial must be actively pursuing marketing
approval for the drug. 83 The treatment IND has several advantages, the
main one being the patient's ability to access drugs two to three years
earlier. 84 The program provides some relief for desperately ill patients,
but there are still problems with limited access due to stringent
regulations.85
The compassionate IND/"fast track" exception is a discretionary per-
mit allowing a terminally ill patient who is unresponsive to approved
therapy to access an unapproved drug currently being tested in clinical
trials.86 The FDA requires detailed recordkeeping, extensive protocols, a
demonstration that the benefits of the treatment outweigh any risks in-
volved, and that the manufacturer provide the drug free of charge. 87
Compassionate INDs are limited and not very popular with drug compa-
nies, particularly after the drug Ganciclovir was approved for AIDS treat-
ment under a compassionate IND and then not approved for marketing
based on data from the compassionate-use physicians. 88 The compassion-
ate-use program slowed down the clinical trial process since doctors were
reluctant to enroll a patient in a controlled clinical trial where the patient
was just as likely to receive a placebo or standard therapy as the new
drug.89
81. Batterman, supra note 59, at 222.
82. Id. at 223.
83. Id. at 223-24.
84. Other advantages include allowing drug companies to charge for the drugs, giving
them an incentive to produce the drugs, and allowing more market competition for smaller
drug companies. Henry, supra note 57, at 624.
85. id. at 625; Batterman, supra note 59, at 224-25.
86. 21 U.S.C. § 356 (2006); Batterman, supra note 59, at 225; Myers, supra note 70, at
314-15.
87. Myers, supra note 70, at 315.
88. See id. at 315, 317 (discussing how drug companies were reluctant to participate in
IND exception programs after a drug was not approved because there were not enough
appropriate test subjects available for the controlled Phase III trial); see also Abigail Alli-
ance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Von Eschenbach, 445 F.3d 470, 474
(D.C. Cir. 2006) (alleging that compassionate-use programs are available only to a "frac-
tion of those in desperate need").
89. Myers, supra note 70, at 315-16 (noting that physicians preferred the compassion-
ate-use program for ganciclovir over enrolling patients in a Phase III clinical trial where
the patient might end up in a control group receiving a placebo or standard treatment).
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If patients are unable to gain access to a clinical trial, treatment IND
program, or compassionate-use program, they can file a new drug appli-
cation with the FDA for access if the drug is already available overseas.90
Although this is generally unsuccessful, patients are not allowed to sue
the FDA for access until after the proper administrative procedures have
been followed. 91 Patients generally sue for a right to access medication
or treatment under substantive due process.
D. CASE LAW ADDRESSING ACCESS TO TREATMENT
OR MEDICATIONS
With very few exceptions, federal and state courts have held that pa-
tients do not have a constitutional right to access treatment or medica-
tions under the Due Process Clause. A brief overview of some of these
cases is provided below.
1. Federal Cases92
a. United States v. Rutherford93
The closest the United States Supreme Court came to deciding this is-
sue was in United States v. Rutherford. In Rutherford, terminally ill can-
cer patients sued for access to Laetrile, a cancer drug not approved as
safe and effective by the FDA.94 The District Court had held that "by
denying cancer patients the right to use a nontoxic substance in connec-
90. See, e.g., Carnohan v. United States, 616 F.2d 1120, 1122 (9th Cir. 1980).
91. Id.; see also Abigail Alliance, 445 F.3d at 473-74.
92. See, e.g., Sammon v. N.J. Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 66 F.3d 639, 645 n. 10 (3d Cir. 1995)
(finding that, "[i]n the absence of extraordinary circumstances," a State's restrictions on a
patient's choice of a particular treatment only requires rational basis review); Mitchell v.
Clayton, 995 F.2d 772, 776 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding patients have no constitutional right to
treatment by uncertified acupuncturists); N.Y. State Ophthalmological Soc'y v. Bowen, 854
F.2d 1379, 1389, 1391-92 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (upholding the government's change in Medicare
regulations banning the use of an assistant surgeon during cataract operations since the
constitutional right to privacy did not protect all choices made by patients and their
physicians regarding medical treatment), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1098 (1989); Smith v.
Shalala, 954 F. Supp. 1, 2-4 (D.D.C. 1996) (finding that the government did not have an
affirmative obligation to provide dying patients access to experimental medical drugs
where the patient was already receiving the drug and the treatment was working, but his
doctor had provided it outside FDA protocols; the FDA's refusal to approve continued
treatment was rationally related to furthering the FDA's interest in protecting public
health and safety); Garlic v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 783 F. Supp. 4, 5 (D.D.C. 1992)
(holding that there was "no support" for the claim that the FDA's barring use of
unapproved medications violated the constitutional right to liberty or privacy), appeal
dismissed, 986 F.2d 546 (D.C. Cir. 1993); Kulsar v. Ambach, 598 F. Supp. 1124, 1125-26
(W.D.N.Y. 1984) (holding that Rutherford v. United States and Carnohan v. United States
barred the plaintiff's claim of a constitutional right of privacy violation since a patient
taking a drug the FDA ordered removed from the marketplace did not have a right to
select a particular treatment or medication, even where the medication was successfully
treating his hypoglycemic disorders); but see Andrews v. Ballard, 498 F. Supp. 1038, 1057
(S.D. Tex. 1980) (holding that plaintiffs had a constitutional right to obtain acupuncture
treatment and that the challenged law was "not necessary to serve the State's interest in
protecting the patient's health").
93. 442 U.S. 544 (1979).
94. Id. at 546.
2007]
SMU LAW REVIEW
tion with their personal health," the Commissioner had "infringed" on
constitutionally protected interests. 95 The Tenth Circuit did not address
the constitutional issue, holding that the terms safety and effectiveness
had "no reasonable application to terminally ill cancer patients" and ap-
proving the District Court's injunction. 96 The Supreme Court reversed
and remanded, finding no provision in the FDCA exempting drugs used
to treat the terminally ill.97
The Court found that Congress intended to protect individuals with
"fatal illnesses" from fraudulent cures and that the congressional record
for the FDCA indicated that experimental drugs used to treat cancer "in
its last stages" fell within the statute.98 The FDA never made an excep-
tion for drugs used to treat the terminally ill and Congress "could have
reasonably intended to shield terminal patients from ineffectual or unsafe
drugs." 99 The majority expressed safety concerns for terminally ill pa-
tients and was particularly focused on the fact that allowing access to the
drugs would allow a patient with a "potentially fatal disease" to reject
conventional therapy "in favor of a drug with no demonstrable curative
properties." 100 Thus, the Court concurred with the FDA Commissioner,
concluding that exempting drugs with no proven effectiveness "'would
lead to needless deaths and suffering among... patients characterized as
'terminal' who could actually be helped by legitimate therapy."' 10 1 Fi-
nally, patients without conventional therapy options were not foreclosed
from experimental cancer drugs because access to clinical trials was avail-
able and monitored according to the FDCA's "explicit provision for care-
fully regulated use of certain drugs not yet demonstrated safe and
effective."10 2
95. Id. at 550.
96. Id. at 550-51 (quoting Rutherford v. United States, 582 F.2d 1234, 1236 (10th Cir.
1978)).
97. Id. at 551.
98. Id. at 552-53.
99. Id. at 553, 555.
100. Id. at 555-56. The majority also expressed concerns over the definition of "termi-
nally ill." Id. at 556-57. This issue is not addressed in this comment but will need to be
defined for the Court to find a fundamental right exists for treatment access. A number of
states have statutes defining "terminally ill." See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 1568.01(l) (West 2000 & Supp. 2007) (terminal illness "means a medical condition result-
ing from a prognosis of a life expectancy of one year or less, if the disease follows its
normal course"); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 5-801(t) (1998 & Supp. 2006) (terminal
condition "means an incurable and irreversible condition that, without the administration
of life-sustaining treatment, in the opinion of the primary physician, will result in death
within a relatively short time"); NEV. REV. STAT. § 449.0195 (Supp. 2005) (terminally ill
"means a medical diagnosis made by a physician that a person has an anticipated life ex-
pectancy of not more than 12 months"); but see CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-191C (2005) (ter-
minally ill "means in the final stage of an incurable or irreversible medical condition which
will result in death within a relatively short time, in the opinion of the attending physi-
cian"); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-7-172(12) (Supp. 2006) (terminally ill "means that the individ-
ual is experiencing an illness for which therapeutic intervention directed toward cure of the
disease is no longer appropriate, and the patient's medical prognosis is one in which there
is a life expectancy of six months or less").
101. Rutherford, 442 U.S. at 557 (quoting 42 Fed. Reg. 39777, 39805 (1977)).
102. Id. at 558-59.
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On remand, the Tenth Circuit stated that it would "serve no useful pur-
pose" to revisit the substantive due process issue from the District Court
because although it was clear that the decision whether to have treatment
was a protected right, the "selection of a particular treatment, or at least a
medication," did not override the government's interest in protecting
public health. 10 3
b. Carnohan v. United States'0 4
A cancer patient who sued for the right to obtain and use a cancer drug
lost when the Ninth Circuit held: (1) that the FDA was responsible for
determining whether or not a drug qualified as a "new" drug, and (2) that
cancer patients had to follow administrative procedure by seeking ap-
proval and being rejected by the Secretary of Health and Welfare before
suing in the courts.10 5 Carnohan did not address the constitutional right
of privacy and personal liberty claims based on the Tenth Circuit's hold-
ing in Rutherford,10 6 stating in dicta that individuals did not have the right
to obtain drugs "free of the lawful exercise of government police
power."1 0 7
c. Cowan v. United States'0 8
Based on the Supreme Court's holding in Rutherford,10 9 the District
Court of Oklahoma denied a terminally ill AIDS patient with no other
treatment options access to an experimental drug in Cowan v. United
States.n 0 Cowan rejected the plaintiff's argument for a right to whatever
treatment he wished due to his terminal condition and denied that the
FDA's prohibitions violated his rights under the Constitution.' Cowan
also expressed concern for the welfare and safety of patients desperate to
live, noting that "permit[ting] terminally ill patients to seek any type of
treatment regardless of the effectiveness ... would create a cottage indus-
try existing solely to provide potential panaceas to highly vulnerable
patients. '112
103. Rutherford v. United States, 616 F.2d 455, 457 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 937 (1980). Note that the Tenth Circuit discussed the issue in a single paragraph and
did not perform a substantive due process analysis to reach its holding.
104. Carnohan v. United States, 616 F.2d 1120 (9th Cir. 1980).
105. Id. at 1121-22.
106. 616 F.2d 455 (10th Cir. 1980).
107. Carnohan, 616 F.2d at 1122.
108. Cowan v. United States, 5 F. Supp. 2d 1235 (N.D. Okla. 1998).
109. 442 U.S. 544 (1979).
110. Cowan, 5 F. Supp. 2d at 1238.





a. People v. Privitera"4
The defendants in People v. Privitera were charged with selling and
prescribing an unapproved drug intended to alleviate or cure cancer.'"15
The California Supreme Court held that medical treatment was not
within the "important decisions" recognized by the United States Su-
preme Court as falling within the right of privacy and, therefore, the "as-
serted right to obtain drugs of unproven efficacy is Not [sic] encompassed
by the right of privacy embodied in either the federal or the state Consti-
tutions."1 16 Privitera relied on FDA findings that patients pursuing access
to unapproved drugs were "coming to legitimate therapy too late" and
"needlessly [dying] of cancer." 17
In Privitera there was also a strong dissent that found the right to pri-
vacy supported a fundamental right "to acquire and to use needed medi-
cation."' n 8 The dissent relied heavily on Justice Brandeis's dissenting
opinion in Olmstead v. United States: "the right to be let alone [is] the
most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.
To protect, that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the government
upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed, must
be deemed a violation .... ,u19 The dissent also concluded that there was
"no compelling reason shown to override the patient's or the doctor's
fundamental right of choice in the treatment setting.' 120
b. Seeley v. State12 1
Following Carnohan,122 Rutherford,12 3 and Privitera,'124 which all found
that there was not a fundamental right of access to medication, Seeley
found the plaintiff's claimed "right to have marijuana prescribed as a pre-
ferred medical treatment for the nausea and vomiting associated with
113. See, e.g., In re Guess, 393 S.E.2d 833, 840 (N.C. 1990) (finding no fundamental
right to receive unorthodox medical treatment, including homeopathic treatment).
114. 591 P.2d 919 (Cal. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 949 (1979).
115. Id. at 921.
116. Id. at 921-22.
117. Id. at 924 (quoting CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1700 (West 1979)). This case
was decided before United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544 (1979), and took issue with
the lower courts' holdings in Rutherford v. United States, 582 F.2d 1234 (10th Cir. 1978).
Id. at 924-25.
118. Id. at 927, 933 (Bird, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 603
(1977)).
119. Id. at 932 (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting)).
120. Id. at 945.
121. 940 P.2d 604 (Wash. 1997) (en banc). Although this case deals with marijuana, the
specific issue analyzed is the substantive due process right to privacy. Cases dealing with
access to controlled substances are outside of the scope of this comment.
122. Carnohan v. United States, 616 F.2d 1120 (9th Cir. 1980).
123. Rutherford v. United States, 616 F.2d 455, 457 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 937 (1980).
124. People v. Privitera, 591 P.2d 919, 925-26 (Cal. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 949
(1979).
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chemotherapy" unpersuasive. 125 The court instead defined the right as
"the right to smoke marijuana. ' 126 The plaintiff argued that a patient
should have a fundamental right to have his physician prescribe drugs to
relieve suffering,12 7 presumably based on O'Connor's Glucksberg concur-
rence, where she stressed that palliative care allowed suffering patients to
obtain relief even when it resulted in death. 128 The court stated that "if a
terminally ill person does not have a fundamental right to physician as-
sisted suicide," then the patient would also not have a "constitutionally
protected right to receive a particular medical treatment over the rational
objections of the state. '1 29
The dissent in Seeley, however, agreed with the plaintiff, arguing that
denying the right requested was a "refusal of palliative relief to a dying
man."1 30 The dissent also argued that the issue was not properly defined
since the "proper focus of the constitutional inquiry is the group for
whom the law is a restriction, not the group for whom the law is
irrelevant. '131
c. Suenram v. Society of the Valley Hospital132.
Finally, in one of the very few cases to find a right to medical treat-
ment, the Superior Court of New Jersey found a fundamental right of an
"informed terminal cancer victim to choose which treatment she shall re-
ceive from a state-licensed physician.' 33 The court's decision was defini-
tive, stating that the "right of the patient to choose or reject a cancer
treatment on the advice of a licensed medical doctor, whether or not it is
approved by the State or a hospital, could not be of a more fundamental
nature.1 34 The decision to deny a person the "last opportunity to make a
choice" about treatment "would display a lack of understanding of the
meaning of the individual's rights in our free society. 1 35
With few exceptions, federal and state courts have held that state regu-
lations were rationally related to a legitimate government interest in
health and safety. But the decisions are all interrelated, with the Tenth
Circuit's decision in Rutherford applying no substantive due process anal-
ysis to a right to access unapproved drugs, and the Ninth Circuit's dicta in
Carnohan being cited as precedent for denying the existence of a funda-
mental right to medication or medical treatment. The courts based their
125. Seeley, 940 P.2d at 612.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 737-38 (1997) (O'Connor; J., concurring).
129. Seeley, 940 P.2d at 619 n.20 (citing Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720-21).
130. Id. at 624 (Sanders, J., dissenting).
131. Id. at 624 & n.8 (Sanders, J., dissenting) (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 894 (1992)).
132. Suenram v. Soc'y of the Valley Hosp., 383 A.2d 143 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1977).
133. Id. at 147.




decisions in part on fear that patients would use unapproved treatments
and needlessly die when another approved alternative was available.
These cases can be distinguished, therefore, when applied to terminally ill
patients who have exhausted all approved treatment options.
Based on this precedent, the Abigail Alliance ("Alliance") first sought
approval from the FDA for new regulations allowing access to drugs for
terminally ill patients.136 After the request was denied, the Alliance filed
a Citizen Petition and received an acknowledgement from the FDA but
no response, which allowed them to challenge the FDA's policies in fed-
eral court and eventually convince a D.C. Circuit panel that there is a
fundamental right to access medical treatment or medication in limited
circumstances. 137
III. ABIGAIL ALLIANCE AND THE GLUCKSBERG ANALYSIS
The panel in Abigail Alliance based its holding on the Glucksberg two-
part test.138 First, the carefully described right was defined as the "right
of a mentally competent, terminally ill adult patient to access potentially
life-saving post-Phase I investigational new drugs, upon a doctor's advice,
even where that medication carries risks for the patient."'1 39 Second, af-
ter analyzing legal history and tradition, the court found that the govern-
ment did "not block access to new drugs throughout the greater part of
our Nation's history.' 140 Third, the Supreme Court's decision in Cruzan
assumed the right to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment; therefore, a
similar right could be inferred to access potentially life-sustaining medica-
tion where no government-approved treatment options existed.141 The
key in both Abigail Alliance and Cruzan was the "patient's right to make
the decision about her life free from government interference.' 1 42
Prior to performing Glucksberg's "more restrictive" analysis, the D.C.
Circuit outlined the Supreme Court's two "distinct approaches" to deter-
mining a fundamental right. 143 The first, involving cases focused on per-
sonal dignity and autonomy, dealt with "the most intimate and personal
136. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Von Eschenbach,
445 F.3d 470, 473 (D.C. Cir 2006).
137. Id. The decision was vacated for rehearing en banc on appellees' petition. Abigail
Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Von Eschenbach, No. 04-5350, 2006
U.S. App. LEXIS 28974, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 21, 2006).





143. Id. at 476. In most cases, plaintiffs attempting to extend concepts of autonomy or
the right of privacy from Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), or Planned Parenthood of Se.
Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), have been unsuccessful. See, e.g., Compassion in Dying
v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 812-16 (9th Cir. 1996), rev'd subnom Washington v. Gluck-
sberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997); Seeley v. State, 940 P.2d 604, 623-32 & n. 12 (Wash. 1997)
(Sanders, J., dissenting) (arguing that Casey stands for an "affirmative due process right to
obtain medical intervention").
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choices a person may make in a lifetime. 1 44 The second referenced the
Nation's history and tradition under the more restrictive Glucksberg anal-
ysis, which required: (1) that a fundamental right be "objectively, 'deeply
rooted in this Nation's history and tradition ... and implicit in the con-
cept of ordered liberty, such that neither liberty nor justice would exist if
[it] were sacrificed,"'1 45 and (2) that the court provide a "careful descrip-
tion of the fundamental liberty interest. 1 46
A. CAREFUL DESCRIPTION OF THE LIBERTY INTEREST
BEING ASSERTED
The D.C. Circuit accepted the Alliance's definition of the question
presented as follows:
Whether the Due Process Clause protects the right of terminally ill
patients to make an informed decision that may prolong life, specifi-
cally by use of potentially life-saving new drugs that the FDA has yet
to approve for commercial marketing but that the FDA has deter-
mined, after Phase I clinical human trials, are safe enough for further
testing on a substantial number of human beings. 1 47
Abigail Alliance noted that the Supreme Court had not settled on how
precise the "carefully defined" right had to be, but interpreted prior deci-
sions as indicating that courts should "proceed with care in examining
substantive due process claims.' 48 In fact, the court appreciated the Al-
liance's narrow definition, based on rights to privacy, liberty, and life,
which did not include an unfettered right of access to drugs, a right to
receive treatment from the government, or a right at the government's
expense.149
B. HISTORY, TRADITION, AND ORDERED LIBERTY
In analyzing history and tradition, the court based its findings on "an-
cient" common law principles, including the right to self-preservation, the
doctrine of necessity, and the law's recognition of "extraordinary mea-
sures" allowing an individual to take action when faced with death, even
144. Abigail Alliance, 445 F.3d at 476 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 851; citing Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecti-
cut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)).
145. Id. at 476-77 (quoting Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721; Moore v. City of E. Cleveland,
431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1943)).
146. Id. at 477 (quoting Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721-23). In a footnote, the court dis-
missed Lawrence v. Texas as precedent, noting that reading Lawrence as limiting history
and tradition to the "last half century would gut the purpose of the Glucksberg test" and
that other circuits treated Glucksberg as controlling after Lawrence or refused to view
Lawrence as a substantive due process decision. Id. at 477 n. 8; see also, Hawkins, supra
note 11, at 425-44 (discussing why courts choose to ignore or distinguish Lawrence as pre-
cedent when dealing with substantive due process cases not addressing issues such as gay
rights or sexual liberty).
147. Abigail Alliance, 445 F.3d at 477-78.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 478.
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allowing the individual to "impinge upon the rights of others.' 150 The
court discussed precedent allowing destruction of property in order to
save life and the common law tradition of liability for interfering with
efforts to preserve or save life, stating that the FDA's regulations "inter-
fere[d] with efforts that could save a terminally ill patient's life.' 151 The
lack of history of drug regulation in the United States also showed that
there was no government interference with access to drugs for over half
the Nation's history, and there were no limitations based on effectiveness
until 1962.152 In fact, patients used drugs for unapproved purposes, also
known as off-label use, all the time.153
The D.C. Circuit found a fundamental right was implied by the "[Su-
preme] Court's conclusion in Cruzan that due process protects a person's
right to refuse life-sustaining treatment."'1 54 Based on the Supreme
Court's finding of a "right to die" in Cruzan, the "logical corollary" was a
freedom to decide whether to take drugs that might prolong one's life.' 5 5
Like Cruzan, the Alliance was asking the government to change its policy
to avoid violating the right of self-preservation. 156 If there was a right to
refuse life-sustaining treatment, then "the same liberty interest must in-
clude the complementary right of access to potentially life-sustaining
medication, in light of the explicit protection accorded to 'life."1 57 The
court again noted the narrow definition provided by the Alliance, stating
that the right was not a general right to life-saving treatment, but rather
"access to investigational new drugs that have cleared Phase I trials."'1 58
The majority also properly distinguished its due process holding from
other cases: Carnohan159 was dicta while Rutherford160 was based on a
request for access to a new drug that had not been approved for human
testing.161 The Alliance was merely seeking the "same right of access en-
joyed by those terminally ill patients lucky enough to secure a spot in
Phase II trials."'1 62
150. Id. at 480.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 481-83.
153. Id. at 483. Off-label uses may include different routes of administration, special
patient populations not mentioned in the labeling (such as children), modified dosing
schedules or therapy durations, and treatment of a disease not indicated in approved label-
ing. Lars Noah, Informed Consent and the Elusive Dichotomy Between Standard and Ex-
perimental Therapy, 28 AM. J. L. & MED. 361, 397-98 (2002).
154. Abigail Alliance, 445 F.3d at 484.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 484-85.
158. Id. at 485 n. 26. Seventy percent of drugs submitted for clinical trials fail in Phase
I; thirty-three percent fail in Phase II. Henry, supra note 57, at 621.
159. Carnohan v. United States, 616 F.2d 1120, 1122 (9th Cir. 1980) (rejecting the ap-
peal as an unripe claim based on FDA procedure, but noting in dicta that the right of
privacy did not give individuals the right to access an unapproved cancer drug).
160. Rutherford v. United States, 616 F.2d 455, 457 (10th Cir. 1980) (holding that the
choice of a particular medication or treatment was not a fundamental right and that the
government's "interest in protecting public health" controlled).
161. Abigail Alliance, 445 F.3d at 486.
162. Id.
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In dissent, Judge Griffith categorized the right at issue as a "fundamen-
tal right to procure and use an experimental drug before the FDA and
scientific community have evaluated its scientific and medical risks and
corresponding benefits as called for in the FDCA."'1 63 He argued that
common law tradition was insufficient to establish a fundamental right,
that history shows the right was not deeply rooted, since drugs were regu-
lated since the "early part of the last century," and that the FDA was
entitled to make the decision on whether "blanket access to experimental
drugs would present unacceptable scientific and medical risks."1 64 Addi-
tionally, the history of the FDCA did not provide a right to procure or to
use experimental drugs; it only established that the government had not
always regulated drugs. 165 The dissent also distinguished the majority's
reliance on Cruzan, arguing that the "right to die" could not provide a
complementary right for informed access to unapproved drugs, since no
patient could be truly informed about the risks or potential benefits
posed.166
C. THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS ANALYSIS
The case was remanded to the District Court for a decision on whether
the government's compelling interest as defined by the FDA was nar-
rowly tailored. a67 The D.C. Circuit, however, later accepted the Alli-
ance's petition for rehearing en banc and vacated the original decision. 168
If, as predicted, 169 Abigail Alliance reaches the Supreme Court, whether
there is a fundamental right subject to strict scrutiny may be determina-
tive,170 but the Court could find a fundamental right and still hold that
the government's compelling interest is narrowly tailored.
IV. ARGUMENT
In order to reach a determination on whether the government's com-
pelling interest is narrowly tailored, the Supreme Court must first find a
fundamental right to self-preservation, then find that self-preservation in-
163. Id. at 489 (Griffith, J., dissenting).
164. Id. at 491-92.
165. Id. at 494.
166. Id. at 496.
167. Id. at 486.
168. Abigail Alliance, No. 04-5350, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 29148, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Nov.
21, 2006) (oral argument was set for March 1, 2007).
169. See Karen Ertel, Terminally Ill Have Fundamental Right to Unapproved Drugs, 42
TRIAL 102 (July 2006) (stating that many lawyers believe the Abigail Alliance decision will
end up before the Supreme Court). The Court would most likely grant certiorari to ad-
dress concerns about expansion of such a doctrine and its application to palliative care
issues. Interview with Linda S. Eads, Associate Professor of Law, Southern Methodist
University, in Dallas, Tex. (Feb. 2, 2007).
170. Seeley v. State, 940 P.2d 604, 630 (Wash. 1997) (en banc) (Sanders, J., dissenting)
("simply labeling the interest has proven dispositive because strict scrutiny is virtually im-
possible to pass while rational basis is virtually impossible to fail"); but see, Winkler, supra
note 10, at 822, 864 (finding that there is a 22% survival rate for substantive due process
claims and a 50% survival rate for substantive due process claims in federal court).
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cludes the right to access medical treatment and medication in limited
circumstances. The Court has previously recognized the "sanctity" of
self-determination, 171 declared points at which the State's compelling in-
terest in life outweighs autonomy, 172 and assumed the right to refuse
medical treatment in particular circumstances, 173 indicating that the
Court may also be willing to infer an individual's right to attempt to save
his or her life. On the other hand, the Court has not been "friendly"
toward recognizing new fundamental rights, and has not provided much
guidance on how courts are expected to define asserted rights or analyze
history and tradition. 174 If the Court accepts the narrow definition pro-
vided by the Alliance for a fundamental right to self-preservation that
includes a right to access treatment or medicine for terminally ill patients
who have exhausted all other treatment options, as well as the D.C. Cir-
cuit's original analysis of legal history and tradition, the Court could de-
clare the asserted right fundamental. This section begins with the
foundational principles justifying a fundamental right to self-preserva-
tion, including access to medication or medical treatment, then looks at
Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding the "right to die," and how the
right asserted in Abigail Alliance meets the Glucksberg substantive due
process test.
A. THERE IS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT OF SELF-PRESERVATION
The District Court in Abigail Alliance rejected the argument that a
complementary right to choose life could be implied from the right to
refuse medical treatment assumed in Cruzan because the Alliance's as-
serted right involved access to "potentially life-saving medication."'' 7 5 An
affirmative right could not be inferred from the freedom from govern-
ment imposition, and without a fundamental right, the District Court
found the FDA policy was rationally related to a legitimate government
interest.176 The D.C. Circuit disagreed and found a fundamental right to
choose life and the method of treatment, relying in part on William
Blackstone's right to "'personal security,"' which encompassed the right
to self-preservation. 177
171. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269 (1990).
172. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 875-76 (1992) (finding
that the state's interest in life outweighed a woman's right to autonomy when the fetus is
viable, unless carrying to term threatens the life or health of the mother).
173. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278-79.
174. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997); Basiak, supra note 8, at
403 ("When asked to recognize a fundamental right under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the U.S. Supreme Court has failed to articulate a substantial jus-
tification for the level of generality in characterizing the legal issue."); Ertel, supra note
169, at 104 (the Supreme Court "might reverse because the Court 'is not that friendly
toward not-before-recognized constitutional rights."').
175. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Von Eschenbach,
445 F.3d 470, 474-75 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
176. Id. at 475.
177. Id. at 480 (quoting WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES *125,*130).
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The concept of self-preservation exists in both religion and philosophy.
In medieval times, self-preservation was seen as a duty enjoined by divine
law that implied a right of self-defense.' 78 Self-preservation was an ina-
lienable right that could not be surrendered or given up by an individual
due to a compact with God. 179 Philosopher John Locke argued that the
right to self-preservation existed and required everyone "to preserve him-
self." s180 The Declaration of Independence states that all men are "en-
dowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights" that include
"Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness."'181 The Framers imple-
mented a Constitution with laws that recognized certain inalienable
rights, including the right to life, and provided a certain level of legal
protection and status for that right.182 The inalienable right to life has
been referred to as "the right to have rights" 183 and as "necessary to the
exercise of all social privileges." 184
The principle of self-determination originates from the inalienable
right to life and provides "a fundamental right to the sole control of his or
her person. '185 Liberty includes not having the State "dictate the manner
in which the duty to live.., is fulfilled. ' 186 The medical community bases
the majority of treatment decisions on the right to self-determination, re-
quiring that a patient be made aware of all his treatment options and
make his own decision about self-preservation, including whether to re-
fuse treatment or proceed with the treatment he has chosen.187 The pa-
tient's choice of treatment, or refusal, is his alone 188
Cruzan recognized the "sanctity" of self-determination: "No right is
held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than
the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own per-
son, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and
unquestionable authority of law."' 189 The concepts of privacy and liberty
178. Valerie L. Myers, Note, Vacco v. Quill and the Inalienable Right to Life, 11 RE-
GENT U. L. REV. 373, 384 (1999).
179. See id. at 389-90.
180. Id. at 386.
181. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
182. See John B. Mitchell, My Father, John Locke, and Assisted Suicide: The Real Con-
stitutional Right, 3 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 45, 84 (2006).
183. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 290 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
184. Daniel Avila, Assisted Suicide and the Inalienable Right to Life, 16 IssuEs L. &
MED. 111, 139 (2000).
185. In re Guardianship of Browning, 568 So. 2d 4, 10 (Fla. 1990).
186. Myers, supra note 178, at 390.
187. Mara Silver, Note, Testing Cruzan: Prisoners and the Constitutional Question of
Self-Starvation, 58 STAN. L. REV. 631, 652 (2005) ("the focus on self-determination is re-
flected throughout the medical community").
188. See Thor v. Superior Court, 855 P.2d 375, 383 (Cal. 1993) ("It is antithetical to our
scheme of ordered liberty and to our respect for the autonomy of the individual for the
State to make decisions regarding the individual's quality of life. It is for the patient to
decide such issues."); Myers, supra note 178, at 390 (arguing that if "an individual has
cancer, he is accountable to God alone for the manner in which he treats his disease .... If
he believes that a different therapy is appropriate, the choice is his").
189. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261,269 (1990) (quoting Union Pac.
R.R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891)).
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also recognize a fundamental right of self-determination, 190 and the
choice of whether to live or die is "as central to individual self-determina-
tion as anyone can imagine."191 Since the right of self-determination has
already been recognized by the Supreme Court, giving the individual a
right to control his or her own person, the logical corollary includes a
right to save one's own life.
B. SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE ON THE RIGHT TO DIE AND THE
FUNDAMENTAL "RIGHT TO LIVE"
Three Supreme Court cases deal with patients' choices of whether to
live or die: Cruzan, Glucksberg, and Vacco v. Quill.192 Cruzan inferred a
right to refuse medical treatment, while both Glucksberg and Vacco held
that the State's interest in preserving and protecting life outweighed the
individual's right to end her life with assistance from a physician.193 All
of the so-called "right to die" cases rejected the idea that an individual's
right to self-determination included a right to medical assistance to die.194
In Cruzan, the State was permitted to require clear and convincing evi-
dence before a guardian was allowed to order removal of life-saving hy-
dration and nutrition. In Glucksberg and in Vacco, the State's interest in
the inalienable right to life outweighed a patient's desire to die with the
help of a physician. Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Gluck-
sberg,195 however, stressed the importance of the availability of palliative
care to relieve patients' suffering, even where such pain management
might result in death.' 96
Palliative care is an accepted medical practice to ease a patient's pain
and suffering, and it was the key reason behind O'Connor's vote. With-
out such a practice in place, the reasoning behind Glucksberg may have
been different, particularly since the importance of palliative care was
acknowledged by three other Justices. 197 Suffering involves much more
than physical pain: "[I]t is a mix of the physical, emotional, existential,
and psychological.' 98 By denying a terminally ill patient the right to live,
or the right to attempt to save her life by accessing experimental drugs,
190. Browning, 568 So. 2d at 9-10 (claiming liberty implied a fundamental right of self-
determination that allowed a patient to refuse medical treatment).
191. Cass R. Sunstein, The Right to Die, 106 YALE L. J. 1123, 1137 (1997).
192. Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702
(1997); Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 261.
193. Vacco, 521 U.S. at 808-09; Ghcksberg, 521 U.S. at 705-06, 720.
194. Vacco, 521 U.S. at 808-09; Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 706; Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 281.
195. Glucksberg and Vacco were companion cases. O'Connor's concurring opinion ap-
plies to both. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 736 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
196. Id. at 737-38 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
197. Id. (Ginsburg concurred with O'Connor, as did Breyer-except for the portions
joining the majority opinion); tA. at 746-48 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) ("That
interest [in preserving human life] not only justifies-it commands-maximum protection
of every individual's interest in remaining alive, which in turn commands the same protec-
tion for decisions about whether to . . . administer pain medication that may hasten
death.").
198. Mitchell, supra note 182, at 61-62.
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the current FDA regulations may sentence to death those who have ex-
hausted all approved treatment options. 199 In addition, a patient's emo-
tional and psychological suffering due to her inability to ever know if she
did everything possible to attempt to save her life is cruel to the individ-
ual and to her family.20 0 As Justice Stevens stated: "The constitutional
protection for the human body is surely inseparable from concern for the
mind and spirit that dwell therein. '20 1 The interest in mitigating suffer-
ing, through palliative care, along with autonomy, integrity, and liberty
concerns, justifies a right to medical intervention.20 2 The right to self-
preservation, the right to life, demands the opportunity to save one's life
so long as it does not infringe on the rights of others.
The Supreme Court has not addressed whether there is a fundamental
right to life, most likely because it is an inalienable right that has not
needed to be addressed. 20 3 The Court has recognized the State's interest
in life and what appears to be a fundamental right to life several times. 20 4
In Cruzan, the Court relied on the right to life to assume there was a
reciprocal, limited "right to die."'20 5 Glucksberg recognized that the State
had an "'unqualified interest in the preservation of human life.'"206
Vacco recognized the State's "valid and important public interests," in-
199. See James Bopp, Jr. & Daniel Avila, The Due Process "Right to Life" in Cruzan
and Its Impact on "Right-to-Die" Law, 53 U. PIrr. L. REV. 193, 202 (1991) (stating that a
decision to withhold live-saving treatment "may constitute a deprivation of life. That dep-
rivation may be intentional if the treatment is nonburdensome and effective."); Brian C.
Goebel, Note, Who Decides if There is "Triumph in the Ultimate Agony"? Constitutional
Theory and the Emerging Right to Die with Dignity, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 827, 830, 875
(1996) (arguing that an individual should be able to control the circumstances surrounding
her own death and that the Eighth Amendment "prohibits a government from inflicting
unnecessary pain and suffering during the dying process and from deliberately denying
prisoners medical assistance that would alleviate their pain and suffering"). In 1980, the
delay in approval time for new drugs was estimated to have cost as many as 45,000 to
70,000 lives of heart-attack victims who could not access beta-blockers, 7,000 deaths for
arthritis sufferers with bleeding ulcers, and thousands of other deaths due to delays for
access to blood thinners and AIDS drugs. Myers, supra note 70, at 322-23.
200. See Goebel, supra note 199, at 875 (arguing that based on the constitutionally pro-
tected interest in mitigating suffering, the dignity interest provided under the Eighth
Amendment should protect an individual's interest in avoiding a lingering death).
201. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 343 (1990) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
202. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852 (1992). See also Goebel,
supra note 199, at 876-79 (arguing for a right to assisted suicide based on autonomy and
liberty interests).
203. See Bopp & Avila, supra note 199, at 198 (discussing that Cruzan did not require
the state to prove that Nancy Cruzan had chosen to live or direct the state to come to her
defense to protect Nancy's life. The state's interest in life arose "naturally and separately
from any exercise of government authority or personal liberty").
204. See, e.g., Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 808-09 (1997); Washington v. Glucksberg,
521 U.S. 702, 728-32 (1997); Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 282; Casey, 505 U.S. at 875-76 (quoting
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973) (recognizing that the State's "important and legiti-
mate interest[s] in preserving and protecting the health of the pregnant woman [and] in
protecting the potentiality of human life") (alterations in original)); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304
U.S. 458, 462 (1938).
205. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 282.
206. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 728-32 (quoting Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 282).
2007]
SMU LAW REVIEW
cluding preserving life.20 7 State courts have also recognized this impor-
tant "fundamental" right.20 8
It is illogical to deny rights to citizens, such as a right to assisted suicide,
based on the State's overwhelming, compelling interest in preserving life,
and then argue that the State has the ability to deny an individual the
ability to attempt to save his or her own life.20 9 If the State's interest in
preserving the sanctity of life outweighs other rights and interests, includ-
ing the right to refuse medical treatment210 in individual cases, it is diffi-
cult to argue that such an overwhelming right ends when applied to
terminally ill patients without other treatment options. The Court has
already recognized that the lives of the terminally ill are no less valued
than the lives of others,211 and where access to treatment does not pose a
danger or hardship to others,212 there is simply not a justifiable reason to
deny someone the ability to try to save her life.
But the question of how far the right to life extends is the crux of the
issue. In most cases, courts have found no right to treatment or access to
medication based on the State's compelling interest in protecting the pa-
tient from harm. These courts, including the Supreme Court, have based
this decision on fear that patients would choose an unproven drug over
proven treatment methods and "needlessly" die. The access right defined
by the Alliance directly addresses this issue by ensuring that this will not
happen.
C. DOES ABIGAIL ALLIANCE MEET THE GLUCKSBERG TEST?
1. Careful Description of the Liberty Interest Being Asserted
The Alliance's careful definition of the asserted right ensured it did not
include an "unfettered" right of access to drugs, where the State's com-
207. Vacco, 521 U.S. at 808-09.
208. See, e.g., McKay v. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d 617, 623 (Nev. 1990) ("The State's interest
in preserving all human life, including that of a particular patient, should not be suspended
or minimized under any conditions."); In re Westchester Co. Med. Ctr., 531 N.E.2d 607,
613 (N.Y. 1988) (holding the right to live is a natural right); Montalvo v. Borkovec, 647
N.W.2d 413, (Wis. 2002) (holding that the state's interest "in preserving life is of para-
mount significance").
209. See V. Anthony Unan, The Right to Choose an Unproven Method of Treatment, 13
Loy. L. A. L. REV. 227, 235 (1979) (pointing out the irony that courts in some cases will
protect the right to refuse medical treatment where the treatment would save the patient's
life, but refuse to protect the right of a terminally ill patient to take an experimental drug
to attempt to save his life).
210. See, e.g., Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 284; Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 27, 37
(1905) (holding that under the principle of self-defense, the State could require mandatory
smallpox vaccinations to protect public health and safety); Commonwealth v. Kallinger,
580 A.2d 887, 888-93 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1990) (holding that based on the State's interests in
preserving human life and preventing suicide, the state could force nutrition and medical
treatment on a prisoner trying to starve himself to death while serving a life sentence).
211. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 728, 731-32; Rutherford v. United States, 442 U.S.
544, 553, 555 (1979).
212. The Supreme Court recognized a right to refuse treatment if it endangered the
individual's health, but found that right was outweighed in Jacobson v. Massachusetts by
the danger posed to others. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 27, 39. The community was allowed to
act in self-defense against a smallpox epidemic. Id. at 27.
[Vol. 60
The Proper Focus for FDA Regulations
pelling interest in protecting the public from taking dangerous drugs
would be narrowly tailored under the FDA regulations. The asserted
right also did not include the right to receive treatment from or at the
government's expense. Both are extremely important to avoid public
policy concerns where the government would be unable to comply for
both healthcare and budgetary reasons. The right as defined is extremely
narrow, and should be successful since the law applies only to "the group
for whom the law is a restriction, not the group for whom the law is
irrelevant. " 2 13
Generally, where the Supreme Court has provided a narrow definition
of a fundamental right the petitioners have lost, while a broad definition
by the Court has resulted in a victory for the petitioners.214 The petition-
ers' definitions of the asserted right in most of those cases, however, have
generally been based on broad claims of rights involving autonomy or
liberty. In Abigail Alliance, the asserted right was very narrowly defined,
which makes it easier to argue that the FDA regulations are not narrowly
tailored within the State's compelling interest. 215 This argument is
strengthened by precedent establishing the State's compelling interest in
protecting the sanctity of life and by Glucksberg's requirement of a nar-
rowly defined right.216
2. History, Tradition, and Ordered Liberty
The history and tradition argument is more difficult. Although a tradi-
tional Glucksberg analysis requires looking at past legal history, therefore
recognizing the right to self-preservation and the State's compelling inter-
est in life, as well as the lack of government interference with access to
medication, it also requires looking at current trends. The fact that it was
not necessary before 1962 to regulate drugs in the manner now enforced
by the FDA does not mean that the current regulations are not narrowly
tailored.217 In fact, the FDA has a strong argument, based on history
with drugs such as Thalidomide and Laetrile, that adding regulations was
213. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 790, 894 (1992).
214. Compare Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 722 (defining the right at issue as "a right to
commit suicide which itself includes a right to assistance in doing so"), and Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190 (1986) (defining the right at issue as "a fundamental right [of]
homosexuals to engage in sodomy... invalidat[ing] the laws of many States that still make
such conduct illegal and have done so for a very long time"), with Lawrence v. Texas, 539
U.S. 558, 564 (2003) (discussing homosexual sodomy, but defining the asserted right as
"whether the petitioners were free as adults to engage in private conduct in the exercise of
their liberty under the Due Process Clause .... "), and Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431
U.S. 494, 501-04, 505 (1977) (plurality opinion) (refusing to accept the state's argument
that the constitutional right to live together as a family included only the nuclear family of
a couple and their dependent children, because the "sanctity of the family" included the
tradition of uncles, aunts, cousins, and grandparents sharing the household).
215. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 877.
216. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 722-23.
217. The government not proscribing conduct is not dispositive, since the "absence of
regulation could be attributable to a liberty interest that is deeply rooted..." but another
explanation such as technology might apply. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Devel-
opmental Drugs v. Von Eschenbach, 445 F.3d 470, 479 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
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necessary to protect public health and safety. Furthermore, medical care
has changed dramatically in the past forty years. The FDA's argument,
however, is undermined by its arbitrary enforcement of the regulations,
when the agency accepts off-label use of drugs and has created treatment
IND and compassionate-use programs to circumvent the very regulations
they argue are necessary to protect the public, including the terminally ill,
from taking dangerous drugs.
Stare decisis may be an issue in Abigail Alliance, since Rutherford es-
tablished that the FDCA did not exempt from FDA regulation drugs
used to treat the terminally ill from FOA regulation, and a number of
lower court cases have followed Rutherford and refused to recognize a
right to access medication or treatment. However, Rutherford did not
discuss, or rule on, the substantive due process argument posed in Abigail
Alliance, and although the Tenth Circuit, on remand, held there was no
right to access medication, it did not perform a substantive due process
analysis. Additionally, the Supreme Court based its Rutherford ruling in
part on fear of patients ,using unapproved drugs in lieu of traditional
treatment and the assumption that access to clinical trials or other excep-
tions were available in desperate situations. Therefore, the Court may
distinguish Rutherford from Abigail Alliance on the substantive due pro-
cess argument and the asserted right, not requiring it to overrule Ruther-
ford to reach a decision.
3. The Fundamental Rights Analysis
To date there has not been a decision in any court on whether the FDA
regulations are narrowly tailored under strict scrutiny. 218 Assuming the
D.C. Circuit upholds the panel decision finding a fundamental right, Abi-
gail Alliance is likely to reach the Supreme Court based on expansion
concerns for such a precedent, particularly in regard to palliative care.
The D.C. Circuit's decision would also create a split between the circuits
about whether there is a fundamental right to access to medication or
treatment.219 The Supreme Court may choose to rely on the analysis per-
formed in Abigail Alliance to find a fundamental right, or use the dis-
sent's argument to explain why the right is not fundamental. The
dissent's argument is flawed, though, since it was based on an asserted
right for "blanket access" to experimental drugs and argued that access
could potentially be harmful, resulting in no patients having enough in-
formation to give informed consent. The Alliance did not ask for blanket
access to drugs, but only requested access when a terminally ill patient
218. Rehearing en banc was set for March 1, 2007. Abigail Alliance, No. 04-5350, 2006
U.S. App. LEXIS 29148, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 21, 2006). If the D.C. Circuit affirms the
panel decision, the case will most likely be remanded to the District Court for a decision on
whether the FDA regulations are narrowly tailored, unless certiorari is granted solely on
the fundamental right issue.
219. Rutherford did not perform an analysis of the defined right or examined the his-
tory and tradition behind it. Rutherford v. United States, 616 F.2d 455, 457 (10th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 937 (1980).
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had no other treatment options. Based on the dissent's argument, no pa-
tient in a clinical trial, or using a drug prescribed for off-label use, can
give informed consent because there is no way of knowing what the effect
will be until after the drug has been taken.
Although the Court seems to have already recognized a fundamental
right to life, based on continual deference to the State's compelling inter-
est in life, it could hold that the right to life does not extend to a right of
access to treatment or medication on policy grounds. The slippery slope
argument regarding illegal narcotics, 220 harm to the healthcare system by
creating exceptions for drug regulation, and problems with the scientific
process required in clinical trials will all be raised. The D.C. Circuit dis-
missed the narcotics argument in its original opinion, stating that the Alli-
ance had requested access to Phase II clinical trial drugs already declared
safe for human testing by the FDA, not drugs banned by the FDA or the
Controlled Substances Act.22 ' Since the Supreme Court has already held
the FDA regulations apply to medications for the terminally ill, it could
deny an affirmative right of access based on Rutherford and hold that the
State's compelling interest in ensuring the public's health and safety does
not allow exceptions to drug regulations. If the right is not fundamental,
the FDA regulations will meet the test for rational basis review. The
Court may also distinguish Rutherford and recognize a right to access to
medications applying only in narrow circumstances, similar to Casey,2
22
where the law only applies to terminally ill individuals seeking experi-
mental treatment when they have run out of options and not to the public
at large or even to terminally ill patients with approved alternatives.
Under a Glucksberg analysis, then, it is possible that the Court will find
a fundamental right based on the narrow definition of the right asserted
and the history and tradition supporting a lack of government interfer-
ence in the past, as well as a number of exceptions to FDA regulations in
the present. The Court should affirm that there is a fundamental right to
life and to self-preservation, and may hold that there is a fundamental
right to attempt to save one's life by accessing medication and treatment.
Even if the Court declares there is a fundamental right to life that in-
cludes limited access to medical treatment and medication, the Court may
still find that the FDA regulations satisfy strict scrutiny.2 23 The next sec-
tion discusses why the Court should find that the FDA regulations are not
narrowly tailored.
220. The dissent in Abigail Alliance argued that the majority's holding would lead to
medicinal use of marijuana or stem cell research. Abigail Alliance, 445 F.3d at 499 (Grif-
fith, J., dissenting).
221. Id. at 477 n.9.
222. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 790, 833 (1992) (stating that the
constitutional analysis "does not end with the one percent of women upon whom the statue
operates; it begins there .... The proper focus of the constitutional inquiry is the group for
whom the law is a restriction, not the group for whom the law is irrelevant.").
223. Sunstein, supra note 191, at 1137 (recognizing the Court could acknowledge the




V. THE FDA REGULATIONS ARE NOT NARROWLY
TAILORED FOR TERMINALLY ILL PATIENTS
WITHOUT OTHER TREATMENT OPTIONS
The government has a compelling interest in the sanctity of life and in
the public's health and safety, which includes ensuring that people do not
take dangerous drugs and that drug regulations are uniformly applied.
When applied generally to patients, including the terminally ill, these im-
portant, compelling interests are narrowly tailored. The FDA regula-
tions, however, are simply not narrowly tailored to the government's
compelling interest when applied to terminally ill patients who do not
have approved treatment options available. 224 The balance tips from the
FDA to terminally ill patients once they have exhausted all approved
treatment options because that is when the situation directly restricts the
patients' rights to self-preservation. Until all other options are ex-
hausted, the FDA regulations do not harm or restrict those individuals.
Once the available options are exhausted, however, the "proper focus"
becomes the "group for whom the law is a restriction, not the group for
whom the law is irrelevant. ' 225 Based on the current regulations, there
are several reasons why terminally ill patients should be able to access
Phase II clinical trial drugs if they have exhausted all approved treat-
ments and are able to pay for the medication. 22 6
First, the State has no need to protect patients from receiving possibly
ineffective treatment when taking the medication may save the patient's
life and is the only option left to try. A State cannot justify depriving a
citizen of life by denying treatment that may sustain life in order to pro-
tect public health when the public is not at risk.227 The FDA will most
likely argue that it should be able to deny access to experimental drugs
based on an individual's inability to prove the treatment does, in fact,
sustain life.228 The individual would be required to demonstrate that all
other treatment options have been exhausted and unsuccessful before re-
questing access to experimental drugs; therefore, the FDA's argument
should be rejected on the grounds that a drug may sustain the patient's
life where the patient will definitely die without the drug.2 29 Until the
FDA can prove the treatment does not sustain life, it has, in fact, proven
that the drug is safe to test in humans by completing a review of the
Phase I clinical trial process. Seventy percent of drugs submitted for
clinical trials fail in Phase I; but only thirty-three percent fail in Phase
224. See Batterman, supra note 59, at 207.
225. Casey, 505 U.S. at 894.
226. The need for individuals to pay for the medication is based on public policy con-
cerns and the principle that there is no right to government aid, even when the individual is
being deprived of life, liberty, or property. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 201 (1991).
227. See Bopp & Avila, supra note 199, at 221-22. See also Jacobson v. Massachusetts,
197 U.S. 11, 39 (1905) (allowing the State to require vaccinations for contagious diseases
due to the public health risk).
228. Bopp & Avila, supra note 199, at 221-24.
229. Id.
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11.230
A non-treatment directive does not pose an "abandonment of the de-
sire for life" by the State, since the underlying disease causes death rather
than the lack of treatment.2 3' The Court could still find the regulations
narrowly tailored in this instance. This argument, however, asserted by
Justice Stevens in his Cruzan dissent, is based on the assumption that the
patient does not wish to live if his life is artificially prolonged with ma-
chines or feeding tubes. It is therefore not viable for terminally ill pa-
tients who wish to fight for their lives, since not taking a number of
medications would result in death, including blood pressure medication,
beta blockers, or insulin shots.2 32
Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Glucksberg recognized a right to
die, but found that the State's interest in protecting life outweighed that
right if a person was not experiencing great suffering and palliative care
was available.2 33 If the State's interest in protecting life outweighs the
right to die, or the right to decide when to die, it should be difficult for
the State to argue it also has the right to deny medical treatment, particu-
larly palliative care, to someone who wants to live.2 34 The FDA's argu-
ment, though, would most likely be that the State is protecting everyone's
health and safety by requiring clinical trials to determine the effectiveness
of drugs prior to placing them on the market. Prior disasters with medi-
cations such as Laetrile, which resulted in a number of cancer patients
postponing chemotherapy treatments and "needlessly" dying, support the
FDA's claim that the regulations protect the public from dangerous
drugs. The narrow right defined here, however, requires patients to ex-
haust all approved remedies before requesting access to experimental
treatments. The FDA's standard argument and the concerns expressed in
Rutherford and Privitera simply do not apply: no patient will have the
opportunity to seek out an experimental treatment while ignoring an ap-
proved, "effective" treatment that could save her life.2 35
Second, the FDA arbitrarily enforces the regulations. The FDA al-
ready makes exceptions for all patients through off-label drug use and
clinical trials, and additional exceptions are made for patients with life-
threatening conditions through compassionate-use and treatment IND
230. Henry, supra note 57, at 621.
231. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 343 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing); see also, Bopp & Avila, supra note 199, at 207 (arguing that "withholding futile care
differs from withholding effective care because in the former case death would occur even
if treatment were provided" and that the State must deliberately interfere for the due pro-
cess clause to be implicated).
232. See Shelly Cohen, Note, De-Moralizing Death: A Humanistic Approach to the
Sanctity of Life, 14 ELDER L. J. 91, 114 (2006) (noting that the underlying disease causes
death argument cannot be as accepted when "medicine itself deviates from what could be
called natural" and that dying a "natural death" is no longer an option for anyone who
takes medication to prolong life, whether for hypertension, diabetes, or other health
problems).
233. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 736 (1997) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
234. See Bopp & Avila, supra note 199, at 221-22.
235. United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 556 (1979).
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programs. It is estimated that half of all prescriptions are for uses not
approved by the FDA, particularly chemotherapy agents used to treat
cancer.236 The American Medical Association has stated that a physician
who is aware of an off-label use of a drug but does not prescribe it for
that use may be subject to medical malpractice liability.23 7 Congress ac-
knowledged off-label use and "authorized Medicaid reimbursement of
pharmaceuticals for uses that appear in certain medical compendia," even
where the FDA has not approved that use for labeling. 238 The FDA,
therefore, approves of physicians prescribing approved cancer drugs to
patients with completely different types of cancer and in different stages
of the disease than that for which the drug has been proven safe or effec-
tive. If the FDA allows all patients, particularly cancer patients, to take
drugs for unapproved, off-label uses, its argument against providing
Phase II clinical trial drugs to patients without other treatment options is
arbitrary and cannot stand.
In Informed Consent and the Elusive Dichotomy Between Standard and
Experimental Therapy, Lars Noah argues that patients are, in fact, sub-
jects in medical research at all times.239 Physicians cannot be sure of a
drug's effect on an individual patient or whether the patient will have an
allergic reaction or suffer side effects more intense than those shown in
clinical trials, much less whether the drug will be effective for the individ-
ual. The FDA interferes with a patient's right to live when it denies a
terminally ill patient with no other options access to an experimental drug
that has been proven safe for testing on humans. Because the FDA al-
ready allows physicians to prescribe drugs not proven effective for pa-
tients, the effectiveness requirement is arbitrary and not narrowly
tailored for patients who will die without treatment and have no other
options.
Similarly, the FDA allows terminally ill patients to take experimental
drugs in a clinical trial setting where the drugs have been proven safe for
testing.240 In Phase II trials, hundreds of people are given the opportu-
nity to decide whether to take these experimental treatments, in some
cases even when other approved treatments are available. The argument
that patients outside of an approved clinical trial group should not have
the same right to decide to take an experimental drug, particularly when
it is the only remaining treatment option, is disingenuous. The govern-
ment cannot deny an individual the right to attempt to save her life when
exceptions are made for the hundreds or thousands of people "lucky
enough" to get into clinical trials.
236. Noah, supra note 153, at 397-98.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 362-63.
240. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Von Eschenbach,
445 F.3d 470, 478 n.9 ("The FDA has determined, upon scientific analysis and evaluation,
that certain Phase I investigational new drugs are sufficiently safe for expanded human
testing in Phase II trials."). Seventy percent of drugs submitted for clinical trials fail in
Phase I; thirty-three percent fail in Phase II. Henry, supra note 57, at 621.
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Finally, the compassionate-use and treatment IND programs are other
exceptions that allow the terminally ill access to experimental drugs
before the drugs have gone through the full clinical trial process. Al-
though the programs are underutilized and the restrictions are almost as
strict as the clinical trial programs, the FDA has recognized that the cur-
rent regulations infringe on an individual's right to life. If there is a fun-
damental right to access, the FDA's exceptions demonstrate that the
agency already knows its regulations are not narrowly tailored for desper-
ate patients without other treatment options.
The FDA's strongest argument is that allowing access to unapproved
medications has proven problematic in the past, may harm the scientific
accuracy of clinical trials, slow down the clinical trial process, and do
more harm than good to the public in the long run. The compassionate-
use problem with Ganciclovir supports the FDA's argument, yet these
patients do not have other options available, and the Court will not look
to the effect on the public, but rather on the individuals directly
burdened.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court could recognize a fundamental right to self-preser-
vation, but whether the Court will find that this right extends to access to
experimental drugs for terminally ill patients with no other treatment op-
tions is debatable. If the Court does find that the asserted right is consti-
tutional in this limited circumstance, they may still hold that the
government's compelling interest in protecting the public from dangerous
drugs is narrowly tailored. Substantive due process, however, requires
that the government's compelling interest in protecting the public from
dangerous drugs be narrowly tailored to no more than what is required,
and the FDA's current regulations are overbroad for terminally ill pa-
tients without other treatment options. Because the FDA allows so many
exceptions, it is unlikely that such arbitrary enforcement of the current
regulations can be considered narrowly tailored. The proper focus is on
terminally ill patients without other treatment options. When a termi-
nally ill patient has exhausted all approved treatment options, she should
be allowed to attempt to save her life by accessing an experimental drug.
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